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Forward looking agents with expectational errors provide a problem for 
monetary policy. We show that under such conditions a standard interest rate 
rule may not achieve determinacy. We suggest a modification to the standard 
policy rule that guarantees determinacy in this setting, which involves the policy 
maker co-ordinating inflation dynamics by responding to each of past, current 
and expected inflation. We show that this solution maps directly into 
Woodford’s (2000) timeless perspective. We trace the responses in an artificial 
economy and illustrate the extent to which macroeconomic persistence is 
reduced following the adoption of this rule. 
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 1 Introduction
The question of how to control an economy in which agents base their
current behavior on forward-looking expectations has recently preoccupied
monetary theorists and policy-makers. In this setting, the main stabilization
device appears to be predictable monetary policy rules, which act to contain
destabilizing expectations. Woodford (2005) has gone as far to argue that:
￿ not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current
conditions, very little else matters￿(p. 3). In this paper we consider the
problem of how to set policy when those expectations are detached from
fundamentals.
The academic literature has considered how active policy rules make
economies prone to unintended equilibrium outcomes, such as a liquidity
trap (Benhabib et al, 2002). It has also shown how forward-looking models
of in￿ ation and output may lead to chaotic dynamics and to indeterminacy
(for example, Benhabib et al, 2001, 2004). To avoid indeterminacy Woodford
(2003a) has argued that the authorities should adopt a rule where nominal
interest rates respond more than equiproportionally to expected in￿ ation
(see also Chari et al, 1998 and Schmitt-GrohŁ and Uribe, 2000). From a
theoretical point of view such rules may be reasonable approximations of
optimal feedback rules (see Bernanke and Woodford, 1997 and Clarida et
al, 2000). But Batini and Pearlman (2002) show that a heavily forward-
looking rule may not be su¢ cient to rule out indeterminacy as reacting to
events that lie far in the future may generate multiple equilibria and dynamic
instability.1
The challenge of designing rules to control expectations has been taken
up by policy-makers, for example King (2005),2 Bernanke (2003)3 and
1Batini and Pearlman (2002) use interchangeably the term indeterminate equilibria or
sunspot equilibria to identify cases where multiple solutions to the model depend either on
extraneous random variables (sunspot) or on more fundamental shocks. Chadha (2007)
also considers the cases where ￿scal policy can threaten the ability of a monetary rule to
achieve determinacy.
2He stresses the impact of policy rules on expectation formation: ￿ A key motivation
for the study of monetary policy rules was the insight that if economic agents base their
decisions on expectations of the future then the way monetary policy is expected to be
conducted in the future a⁄ects economic outcomes today. Hence it is very important to
think about how policy in￿ uences the expectations of the private sector￿(p. 5).
3Bernanke (2003) argues that: ￿ The central bank must also maintain a strong
commitment to keeping in￿ ation ￿ and, hence, public expectations of in￿ ation￿ ￿rmly
under control. Because monetary policy in￿ uences in￿ ation with a lag, keeping in￿ ation
under control may require the central bank to anticipate future movements in in￿ ation
and move preemptively. Hence constrained discretion is an inherently forward-looking
2Trichet (2005). Recently Trichet (2005) has taken this point further
and looked at the implications for monetary policy of misled in￿ ation
expectations, that is expectations that are dislodged from economic
fundamentals, and suggests that ￿ misled market expectations can amplify
and prolong the dynamic response of in￿ ation and real activity to an
in￿ ationary or de￿ ationary shock of su¢ ciently great potency￿(p. 3).
Given the importance of this ongoing policy debate, we consider a policy
rule that is not only designed to stabilize expectations tied to fundamentals,
as in the canonical literature, but also to control for expectational errors
that are not. For our purposes, we may motivate expectational errors from
the possibility that agents may have theories of in￿ ation determination that
di⁄er from the model used by policy-makers or that there is systematic
heterogeneity across agents in forming in￿ ation expectations (see Ireland,
2003; Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers, 2003).
Expectational errors may lead to indeterminacy of a rational expectation
solution and a number of papers have considered how to ensure stability
in this setting (see Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2006). Orphanides and
Williams (2005) show that when there are expectational errors, but the
process for in￿ ation is learnable, a rise of private in￿ ation expectations
beyond those implied by perfect knowledge can be resolved by a forecast-
based rule with a more aggressive response than could be expected in normal
conditions. In this case expectational errors could gradually be learnt away.4
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) have noted that when the economy is
subject to expectational errors, but the process of in￿ ation is not learnable, a
backward-looking component in the policy rule could rule out indeterminacy.
Such policy commits the Central Bank to move future policy rates in
response to today￿ s in￿ ationary momentum. This commitment corrects over
time the drift in in￿ ation that would otherwise be induced by following
in￿ ation expectations alone. This timing di⁄erence is crucial as the
monetary authorities do not move until long after the public has moved. So
one suggestion is to target previous in￿ ation errors in order to give an anchor
to monetary policy. And in the real world it may be di¢ cult to distinguish
between an economy driven by a non-fundamental shock only and an
economy driven by both fundamental and non-fundamental shocks. Beyer
and Farmer (2003) have shown that such economies lead to observationally
equivalent reduced form models, which means that the policy-makers cannot
policy approach￿(p. 1).
4For an analysis of the interaction between sunspots, monetary policy and learning in
New-Keynesian models see also Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) and Honkapohja and Mitra
(2004).
3rule out by observation alone, the possibility of expectational errors in
in￿ ation.
In this paper, we ￿nd that responding to each of past, current and
expected in￿ ation acts to co-ordinate in￿ ation through time so that unstable
dynamics do not emerge. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd that by just targeting one
or two of past, current or expected, the system remains dominated by
expectational errors. We can illustrate with some simple examples. Suppose
there are persistently positive expectational errors and these are targeted by
the central bank, as an indicator of future in￿ ation. Policy rates will then
rise and there will be a surprise de￿ ation for agents who face higher than
expected real rates. If expectational errors remain elevated then output
will continue to fall as real rates remain high. Such an economy will only be
stabilized if the central bank rati￿es the agents￿raised in￿ ation expectations
by cutting interest rates. If, however, the central banks acts solely on past
in￿ ation then it will ￿nd itself continually trying to catch-up with a process
in which agents￿expectational errors drive the system. We ￿nd that by
targeting past policy errors, responding to current in￿ ation and by taking
into account in￿ ation expectations, then policy makers can stabilize this
system in spite of the presence of persistent expectational errors.
To derive the optimal policy response in presence of expectational errors,
we design the rule in two stages: ￿rst, we write a history dependent rule,
which is dynamically consistent (Woodford, 2000).5 The timeless targeting
rule applies the same ￿rst order conditions for in￿ ation and output in
each time period and ignores any start-up conditions. This feature implies
that there is no change in the constraints operating on the central bank
model and hence no dynamic inconsistency. The second stage requires the
expectational error to be expressed as a function of fundamental shocks
and are thus restricted to eradicate expectational errors. Following the
suggestion of Evans and Honkapohja (2006), the monetary authorities
should therefore condition their policy action on the structural equations
of the model characterizing fundamental shocks and endogenous variables.6
We ￿nd that if the central bank commits itself to set interest rates in
5Woodford (2005) writes on the superiority of history dependent rules over ￿let bygones
be bygones￿ rules: ￿ In general the most e⁄ective policy (the best outcome from among
the set of possible rational-expectations equilibria) requires that policy be conducted in
a history dependent way, so that policy at any time depends not only on conditions then
(and what it is considered possible to achieve from then on), but also on past conditions,
even though these no longer constrain what it is possible to achieve in the present￿(p.7).
See also McCallum and Nelson￿ s (2004) clear exposition of the same point.
6Evans and Honkapohja (2006) show that right amount of response to expectations
also yields determinacy and learnability.
4accordance with a Past-Current-Expected (PCE) rule, then the rational
expectation equilibrium of a forward-looking system with expectational
errors is necessarily determinate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how expectational
errors lead to indeterminacy of the solution. Section 3 shows how an
expectational errors can be eliminated by appropriate use of a PCE policy
rule. Section 4 examines the local determinacy region of the system solution
and illustrates policy experiments on a standard New-Keynesian models
with in￿ ation forecast errors. Section 5 concludes.
2 Expectational errors and determinacy
Let us consider the following companion form representation for Xt =
[xt;Etxt+1]0, given some variable xt;:
AXt = BXt￿1 + ￿!t : (1)
Where A, B and ￿ are conformable matrices and !t is an expectational
error:
!t = xt ￿ Et￿1xt ; (2)
de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the actual value of xt and its expectation,
Et￿1xt.
The reduced form of (1) is:
Xt = A￿1BXt￿1 + A￿1￿!t : (3)
where given the form of A￿1B the system may be indeterminate. The policy
problem is to render the system determinate by adopting a rule, some matrix
K; which acts on Xt￿1 = [xt￿1;Et￿1xt]0
Ut=KXt￿1 : (4)
We now introduce the control variable Ut in the original system (1):
Xt=A￿1BXt￿1 + DUt + A￿1￿!t : (5)
where D is conformable matrix for Ut. By replacing in (5) the rule de￿ned
in (4) the reduced form model can be rewritten as:





is the stability matrix for the system in Xt:




is said to be stabilizable if there
exists a matrix K such that A￿1B + DK is a stabilty matrix for X: This
implies that Xt ! 0 as t ! 1.
We can say that C is a stability matrix if the number of eigenvalues of
C inside or outside the unit circle, in the complex plane, correspond to the
number of predetermined and jump variables in the vector of endogenous
variables, Xt (see Blanchard and Khan, 1980). Any further endogenous
variables which are a function of Xt will also be stabilized by C.
2.1 A simple model for in￿ ation
Now consider a system in which there is forward-looking behavior and
expectational errors, for example, a standard forward-looking in￿ ation
equation:
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 ; (6)
where ￿t is current in￿ ation and Et￿t+1 is expected in￿ ation based on
information at time t. As in Beyer and Farmer (2003) we impose the general
parameter restriction j ￿ j> 0 on the discount factor:
Now consider the di⁄erence between actual, ￿t; and expected in￿ ation
Et￿1￿t
￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t = !t ; (7)
where there is an expectational error, !t (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2003
and Beyer and Farmer, 2003). As people may have theories of in￿ ation
determination that di⁄er from the true model (Ireland, 2003) or that disagree
with each other (Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers, 2003) we could think of (7) as
a representing any alternate theory of in￿ ation determination.






















Proposition 2 A forward-looking system with expectational errors is prone
to indeterminacy.
6In order to give a simple proof of the above proposition we verify
the conditions listed in Appendix A for the existence of a saddle point
equilibrium exist.
Given the reduced form representation (1) with Xt = [￿t;Et￿t+1]0 we
calculate A￿1 simply to give:
A￿1 =
￿





















The roots of system (10) are equal to zero and ￿￿1, so there are
insu¢ cient explosive roots to determine uniquely the endogenous variables of
the model. So, this system as it stands has no unique rational expectations
equilibrium (for a similar proof, see Beyer and Farmer, 2003).
To illustrate how the absence of a proper control rule in a forward-
looking system with expectational errors may lead to a drift in in￿ ation, we
simulate the process for in￿ ation described by (8),7 where the dynamics for
in￿ ation, ￿t, are written as a function of the expectational error, !t. To make
the process comparable with US experience we derive expectational errors
as the di⁄erence between year on year in￿ ation calculated on US consumer
price in￿ ation and one-year in￿ ation expectations from the Michigan Survey
over the years 1979-2006.8 The three panels of Figure 1 shows the simulated
in￿ ation from the solution of (8) plotted against actual in￿ ation in each of
three sub-periods: 1979-1989, 1990-1999 and from 2000-2006. In the ￿rst
period, the range for actual in￿ ation is around 12% but for the simulated
series it is around 35% i.e. around 3 times the observed. In the middle panel,
the range for in￿ ation is around 4% and for the simulated series it is around
25% and in the bottom panel we can see that the ranges fall to 2% and 15%,
respectively. So it would seem that the simulations project greater in￿ ation
variance, on the basis of in￿ ation expectational errors, than we actually
observe and that this tendency increases through time i.e. the ratio of the
simulated and actual in￿ ation series rises. This is not to argue necessarily
7In order to simulate the process for in￿ ation we set the initial value for the in￿ ation
to the actual level of US in￿ ation.
8We use the US Consumer Prices (all items less food and energy), seasonally adjusted
by the BLS. The Michigan Survey commenced in 1948 and provides a survey on expected
in￿ ation. More than 500 respondents, solicited by telephone, are asked to provide
























































































Figure 1: In￿ ation with Non-Fundamental Shocks and an Indeterminate
Policy Rule
8that the policy rules have altered to produce a more stable in￿ ation process
but it would seem that the contribution of in￿ ation expectational errors to
the in￿ ation process has somehow been mitigated. In the following section
we show how it is possible to stabilize the solution for in￿ ation with a policy
rule that responds to the history of expectational errors.
2.2 Expectational errors with a policy rule
We examine how policy can act to bring about a unique rational expectations
equilibrium. We model policy as simply acting on any or all of lagged,
current or expected in￿ ation.9 Appendix B shows that in all these cases the
policy rule does not lead to an unique rational expectations equilibrium. In
the next section though we show that it is possible for policy to introduce
stability and determinacy but that in the presence of expectational errors
policy must act against all of past, current and future in￿ ation plus the
fundamental in￿ ation shock.
2.2.1 Past, current and expected in￿ ation
Let us ￿rst consider the following forward-looking model for in￿ ation:
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + kyt + v￿
t ; (11)
where the parameter k > 0, v￿
t is a supply shock that satis￿es Et￿1v￿
t = 0
and yt is aggregate demand:
yt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) ; (12)
which depends on the real interest rate it ￿ Et￿t+1.
We now consider a general form of the problem where the policy rate,
it, acts against past, current and expected in￿ ation (PCE) and the in￿ ation
shock in equal measure:
it = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 + ￿v￿
t : (13)
Setting k = 1 and replacing (13) and (12) in (11) the in￿ ation equation can
be rewritten as:
9Bullard and Mitra (2002) also study macroeconomic systems with forward-looking
private sector agents and a monetary authority that is trying to control the economy
through the use of a linear policy rule. However, they use stability under recursive learning
as a criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules in this context.
9￿t = (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t + ￿￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v￿
t : (14)
Let us keep the expectational error in in￿ ation given by (7). In companion
form (14) and (7) are:
￿























































If the equilibrium is unique, as in Beyer and Farmer (2003), there must
be one unstable root that allows to pin down the non predetermined variable
Et￿t+1 as a function of the lagged state variable ￿t￿1 and the fundamental
shock, v￿
t :If the equilibrium is unique the non-fundamental shock, !t, will
be determined endogenously as a function of v￿
t . First, we examine whether
the conditions for a saddle-point equilibrium exist in this case. We see that
det(A￿1B) =
￿
(1+￿￿￿) and tr(A￿1B) =
(1+￿)
(1+￿￿￿): As the trace is positive we




(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)




(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
> ￿1;
which is always true if ￿ > ￿. So if the feedback rule coe¢ cient on past,
current and expected in￿ ation is higher than ￿; the system is regular
We now turn to analyze how well the in￿ ation process implied by (16),
under stability, tracks the observed in￿ ation data for the US. As in the
10previous example,10 we express (16) as a function of the non-fundamental
error, !t: Again we derive expectational errors as the di⁄erence between
core CPI in￿ ation and by one-year in￿ ation expectations from the Michigan
Survey in the sample 1979-2006. We also add to the in￿ ation process a
normally distributed fundamental shock, v￿
t matching the observed standard
deviation over this period.11 In the top panel of Figure 2, the range for
simulated in￿ ation under the PCE policy rule is less than 2%, whereas
actual in￿ ation ranges over 12%. During the period of 1990-1999, the PCE
policy rule simulates an in￿ ation range of around 1% compared to the actual
range of some 4%. Finally in the bottom panel, we see a relatively close
mapping between the PCE policy-induced in￿ ation rate and actual in￿ ation
with ranges of a similar order of magnitude. This suggests that if the PCE
policy rule had been adopted then the variance of actual in￿ ation may have
somewhat less than the observed one. But also that in the most recent
period, the rules adoped by the Federal Reserve may have incoporated some
elements of our suggested rule.
The problem for the policy-maker, who cannot know for certain whether
there has been an expectational error, is to set rule-based policy so that
even if there are expectational errors, the in￿ ation process observes a process
similar to that contained in Figure 2: where in￿ ation in the presence of both
fundamental and non-fundamental shocks can still locate a unique rational
expectations equilibrium. Here we note that, while at the beginning of
the sample the simulated in￿ ation cannot track actual in￿ ation, a closer
correspondence can be found towards the end of the sample considered.12
Table 1 gives the standard deviation of CPI ex food and energy year-on-
year in￿ ation in the three-sub periods alongside the resuls of the simulation
under an indeterminate rule (Figure 1) and a stabilizing rule (Figure 2).
Proposition 3 In the presence of expectational errors the policy rule may
be required to respond to each of past, current and expected (PCE) in￿ation
in order to stabilize in￿ation.
In order to ensure the regularity of the system in the presence of
10In order to simulate the process for in￿ ation we set ￿ = 1: We also set the initial value
for the in￿ ation to the actual level of US in￿ ation.
11The mean and standard deviation of $t and ￿
￿
t over this sample is [1,0.36 ] and [2.3
,0.4 ], respectively.
12The results of this simulation of the same structural model for in￿ ation where there
are no expectational errors but still a stabilizing policy rule is in force, would be similar
to that contained in Figure 2. Therefore, in line with Beyer and Farmer (2003), there is
an observational equivalence between a world of expectational errors plus fundamentals






















































































Figure 2: In￿ ation with Fundamental and Expectational Errors and a
Stabilizing Policy Rule.
12Table 1: Standard Deviation of Actual and Simulated US In￿ ation
In￿ ation Simulated Solution
Indeterminate Stabilizing
1979-1989 3.04 7.29 0.32
1990-1999 1.00 5.79 0.15
2000-2006 0.45 3.44 0.18
expectational errors, the policy rule must be respond to previous errors but
also pay attention to current in￿ ation and expectations, which may result
from fundamental shocks.13 In the following section we show how to derive
an optimal rule for this system.
3 An Expectations Based Timeless Targeting
Criterion
We now show that the rule identi￿ed in section 2.2.1 is the optimal response
from an expectation based timeless perspective. We ￿rst de￿ne a loss
function for the monetary authority. The central bank￿ s problem at some


















where ￿ is the relative weight between output and in￿ ation in the loss
function and ’t is the Lagrange multiplier. The authorities￿minimization
problem is subject to the constraint that the evolution for in￿ ation represents
a possible rational expectations equilibrium, i.e. that satis￿es
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + v￿
t , (18)
for all periods t > 1. We assume that there is no welfare loss resulting from
nominal interest rate variation as the policy rule is fully used to o⁄set the
13Regularity refers to the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) condition for the existence of a
rational expectations equilibria which in turn is related to the assumptions we make about
predeterminacy or non-predeterminacy of relevant variables.
13in￿ ation expectational errors and the other fundamental shocks (see also
McCallum and Nelson, 2004; Woodford, 1999). Consequently, we omit the
constraint on output as it does not bind.
Finally, output is given by:
yt = Etyt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + v
y
t ; (19)
where ￿ > 0 and we assume that the economy is perturbed by a fundamental
demand shock which satis￿es Et￿1v
y
t = 0: Hence the relevant constraint for
the monetary authorities is that interest rates are set so that deviations of
output and in￿ ation from target - which are assumed to zero in both cases
- are minimized given the constraint on in￿ ation expectations as governed
by equation (18).
The ￿rst order conditions of (17) w.r.t. ￿t and yt are:
￿t + ’t ￿ ’t￿1 = 0 for t = 1;2;::: (20)
￿yt ￿ ￿’t = 0 for t = 1;2;:: . (21)
The central bank ignores the start-up condition ￿1 + ’1 = 0 and applies
(20) and (21) in all periods. And so there will be no dynamic inconsistency
as the relationship between ￿2 and y2 chosen in period 2 agrees with the
relationship planned in period 1:
Combining (20) and (21), the evolution of in￿ ation satis￿es:
￿￿t + ￿yt = ￿yt￿1: (22)
According to (22) the optimal rule with commitment must be
dynamically consistent in each time period and hence history dependent
(Woodford, 2000).14 But we know from Section 2 that such a rule will not be
su¢ cient to stabilize a forward-looking model with expectational errors. The
second stage requires the expectational error to be expressed as a function
of fundamental shocks, which are in turn restricted to cancel expectational
errors. The monetary authorities should therefore condition their policy
14The optimal targeting criterion, as also stressed by Woodford (2003a), suggests that
with an optimal time consistent rule it is the rate of change rather than the absolute
level (as in the discretionary case) that should determine acceptable deviations from the
long-run in￿ ation target.
14action on the structural equations of the model characterizing fundamental
shocks and endogenous variables (Evans and Honkapohja, 2006).15
In our case the targeting criterion will be expressed as an interest rate
rule that is a function of the exogenous disturbances and of period t and
t￿1 expectations of state variables. Solving the Phillips￿curve for yt￿1 and
substituting both yt￿1 and the structural equations for ￿t and yt, as de￿ned













￿￿ (￿ + ￿2)
(￿Et￿1￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) (23)
+
￿












This solution has arguments in both past, current and expected in￿ ation
as in proposition 3. The interest rate targeting rule (23) acts twofold to rule
out expectational errors: (i) it introduces a backward in￿ ation component
which acts as a stationary control for the formation of future in￿ ation
expectations; (ii) it eradicates the expectational shocks by expressing them
as a function of the fundamentals shocks, v
y
t and v￿
t . So the interest rate
today will respond to expected in￿ ation, current in￿ ation and past in￿ ation.
The anchor to past in￿ ation is required to introduce a correction to previous
errors in the forward-looking system and it has the e⁄ect of mitigating the
in￿ ationary spiral of pure forward-looking rules.16 So if the expectation at
time t￿1 of in￿ ation at time t, Et￿1￿t; is greater than in￿ ation at time t￿1,
i.e. agents expect in￿ ation to rise, then the policy maker should increase




If the central bank commits itself to set the interest rate in accordance
with this ￿ exible reaction function, then the rational expectation equilibrium
15Evans and Honkapohja (2003) show that a fundamental based policy rule which would
be the optimal rule without commitment, when private agents have perfectly rational
expectations, is unstable if in fact agents follow standard adaptive learning rules. To
achieve a monetary policy which both is stable under learning and implements optimal
discretionary policy the design of the rule must explicitly take into account of private
sector expectations and the economic structure. However, the rule derived under learning
is not unique.
16Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) also derive optimal generalized rules where explosive
growing response of the funds rate to deviation of in￿ ation from target are ￿ avoided only if
subsequent deviations with the opposite sign eventually counteract the e⁄ects of an initial
deviation￿(p. 47).
15is necessarily determinate. We return to illustrate this result with reference
to a number of policy experiments in section 5.
3.1 Stability Condition of the Timeless Criterion
We now rewrite the timeless policy rule (23) in the simple case ￿ = ￿ = 1
and v￿
t￿1 = 0 and check whether this rule ensures determinacy:

















The implied targeting rule suggests that to pin down a non-fundamental
shock on in￿ ation authorities should give a weight greater than one on
forward-looking in￿ ation. However this is a necessary but not su¢ cient
condition as there should be also su¢ cient weight on past in￿ ation, which
should have a higher weight than the previous period￿ s expectation of current
in￿ ation. This condition is automatically satis￿ed if ￿ < 1.




























Note that after substituting (25) in the in￿ ation equation (18) both the
expected output, Etyt+1; and the output shock, v
y
t , cancel out leaving a
reduced form for in￿ ation which is just a function of expected, current,
past in￿ ation and the in￿ ation shock. We note that we have now one
predetermined variable since the optimal rule is targeting both current,
expected and past in￿ ation, therefore introducing an inertial component
in the reduced form equation for in￿ ation.
We can easily show that the trace is tr(A￿1B) = 1 + 1
￿ + 1
￿￿ so it is
positive and greater than two and det(A￿1B) = 1
￿ so it is greater than one:
This means that at least one of the roots lies outside the unit circle, therefore
pinning down the non-predetermined variable (this can also be shown by
calculating the roots of the characteristic equation for A￿1B by hand). As
16a further proof of the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium we verify that
the following conditions hold (see Woodford, 2003a, p. 671):












In our case both conditions are ful￿lled therefore implying that one of the
roots is inside the unit circle.
Since the number of roots of A￿1B which are less than one in absolute
value are equal to the number of predetermined variables then the system
is determinate. We will denote the characteristic roots of A￿1B as ￿s and
￿u with j ￿s j< 1 and j ￿u j> 1. We can also express the non-fundamental
shock !t as a function of the fundamental shock, v￿
t . This implies that even
in the presence of expectational errors a timeless policy rule renders the
equilibrium of the model determinate. As since the model (26) is regular
and determinate we can derive an explicit solution for in￿ ation in terms of
the lag of in￿ ation and the fundamental shock alone.
Proposition 4 With a timeless policy rule the rational expectations
solution of the system is regular and determinate and can be expressed
as a function of past in￿ation and fundamental shocks, which are in turn
restricted to eradicate the expectational error:










Appendix C shows how to derive the result in the above proposition. The
result follows as the reduced form (26) assumes the presence of a backward
component of in￿ ation in the optimal policy rule that acts to control our












i.e. as a function of the fundamental shock pinning down any expectational
error.17






174 Numerical Analysis of the System
We now turn to a numerical analysis of our arti￿cial economy. We use
Sims￿ method (2001), which has the advantage of exploiting the notion
of the forecast errors introduced in (7). As we have shown in Section
3.1, under determinacy these forecast errors will be a function of the
fundamental shocks. To assess how non-fundamental shocks in￿ uence the
equilibrium dynamics we introduce (belief) shocks "￿
t and "
y
t. As in Lubik




a revision of forecasts. Suppose that based on the forecasting error, there is





t = f (!￿
t ) , (31)
"
y






t is the forecast error for in￿ ation or output between t ￿ 1
and t.
The reduced form described by (18), (19) and (23), following Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003), can be expressed in terms of the forecast errors (31) and
(32) as:






t ) + v￿
t , (33)














where ￿1 = (1 +
￿￿
￿(￿+￿2)); ￿2 = 1
￿; ￿3 =
￿￿
￿k(￿+￿2); ￿4 = ￿
￿k(￿+￿2):
The model can be represented as a six dimensional system that includes
the conditional expectations Et￿t+1 and Etyt+1 as endogenous variables. As
the in￿ ation shock enters with a lag it has to be treated as an endogenous
variable in the system. De￿ning Xt = [￿t;y t;it;Et￿t+1;Etyt+1;v￿
t ] the
system can be rewritten as:
det(A
















+ ￿!t , (36)










comprises the vector of fundamental shocks, ￿t, and by the vector of belief
shocks, "t, which is serially uncorrelated. Belief shocks are thus treated




t ] identi￿es the endogenous expectational errors.
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The Jordan form of matrix A￿1B (Sims, 2001) is P￿1￿P where P and
P￿1 are the matrices of eigenvectors and ￿ is the matrix of eigenvalues.
Multiplying the system by P and de￿ning Zt = PXt we can rewrite the
above expression as:










t. Note that we do
not have a vector of constants as all variables are expressed as deviations from steady-state.






































t+j.19 In order to ensure stability









+ Pu:A￿1￿!t = 0 : (39)
hence






To ensure stability the expectational errors, !t; are expressed as a function
of the fundamental shock, ￿t, and of the non-fundamental shocks, "t. Hence
even with belief shocks we can generate the full set of stable solutions to the
system, as long as equation (40) is satis￿ed. This result is analogous to (30),
which was derived for the stylized reduced form model (26), where the stable
solution for in￿ ation expresses the non-fundamental expectational error as
a function of the fundamental shock. If the condition (40) is ful￿lled the
system is determinate i.e. the policy has successfully eliminated any possible

























which gives the result in the text.
20Determinacy problems may arise if there are insu¢ cient exogenous shocks ￿t and "t
to o⁄set the endogenous non-fundamental shocks in !t. In order for the solution to be
determinate, (40) has to pin down not only P
u￿! but also all the other error terms in
the system that are a⁄ected by the expectational sunspot error term !: That is from the
knowledge of P
u￿! we must be able to determine P
s￿! where P
s includes the rows of
P
￿1 not included in P
u (Sims, 2001). In addition if P
u has more rows than columns this
problem is equivalent to the usual notion that there are regularity problems as the number

























Figure 3: Local Determinacy of System Solution
4.1 Local Determinacy of the System
To analyze the local determinacy of the system and its dynamic properties
we start by assigning some standard benchmark values to ￿;￿ and ￿.
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and most of standard literature
we set the (quarterly) discount factor ￿ to 0.99, implying an annual rate of
4%. We also set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿; to 1.0 and the
output elasticity of in￿ ation, ￿; equal to 0.3 which is chosen by Woodford
(1999). We also set the relative weight of output with respect to in￿ ation
in the loss function to be equal to 0.1.
Figure 3 indicates whether the solution to the system de￿ned by (33),
(34) and (35) is determinate. We ￿x a grid of admissible values for each of
the interest rate rule coe¢ cients on expected, current and backward in￿ ation
￿1;￿3 and ￿4 which are de￿ned in (35) and examine whether the solution
is determinate. The darker regions of Figure 3 correspond to the stable
zones of the system. In forward-looking systems characterized by forecast
errors caused by non-fundamental shocks a coe¢ cient greater than unity
21on expected in￿ ation (￿1 > 1) is not su¢ cient to guarantee stability. As
proposition 3 states we need all the components of in￿ ation (backward,
current and expected) to enter the feedback rule with the coe¢ cients ￿1 and
￿4 greater than unity. The darkest region of Figure 4 shows the solution is
always determinate where ￿1; ￿3 and ￿4 are greater than one.
4.2 Policy Experiments
We now turn to some policy experiments on system de￿ned by (33), (34)
and (35) by comparing the impulse responses for in￿ ation, output and real
interest rates to the fundamental shocks and to the non-fundamental shock





t ] when we implement the Past-Current-Expected (PCE)
policy rule and when we implement a Past-Current (PC) rule. From our
simulations, it is clear that failure or delay to adopt PCE rule will result in
more in￿ ation and output persistence.
A cost-push shock, ￿￿
t ; that hits aggregate supply, causes a temporary
increase in in￿ ation. With a PCE rule nominal interest rates increase sharply
in response to the higher levels of current and expected in￿ ation. Because
of the higher real interest rates output decreases. In the subsequent periods
real rates will then gradually revert to their long-run level, which in turn will
boost output back to equilibrium. The main di⁄erence between both the
PCE and the PC rule is that when there are forward-looking components,
in￿ ation dynamics are less persistent and revert quicker to its long-run
equilibrium. In general the PCE rule performs better than the PC rule,
as the ￿ uctuations in both in￿ ation and output are lower. Conversely the
purely backward-looking PC rule is not capable of stabilizing in￿ ation.
In presence of a demand shock, ￿
y
t, the real interest rate picks up
immediately after the shock to avoid in￿ ationary spirals. Note that in this
case the initial shock is fully compensated by the increase in interest rates
at time zero. So neither output nor in￿ ation will be subject to variations
-there are just in￿nitesimal ￿ uctuations around zero. That the demand
shock a⁄ects only interest rate can be seen from the simpler feedback rule











The responses of Xt are determined by the rows of G
i
1 and Wt￿i: These are the responses
of X to standard shocks in et i.e. Xt = Ctet +Ct￿1et￿1 +Ct￿2et￿2:::where the matrix Ck
has the interpretation
@Xt
@et￿k = Ct￿k which will be used in our impulse response analysis.
22(25), where the interest rate responds one to one to the output shock,
therefore o⁄setting its e⁄ects in all the other equations. As we assume
that full stabilization on the output shock occurs with all the rules in the
same manner, the real interest rate will be identical in all the two scenarios.
The ￿nal column of charts in Figure 4, assumes a non-fundamental shock
in in￿ ation, "￿
t . In this case real rates have to increase in order to o⁄set the
in￿ ation non-fundamental shock. However, when adopting a PCE rule there
will be no possibility for the in￿ ation expectational error to settle in the
economy as by de￿nition the system is determinate, so a PCE rule will rule
the non-fundamental errors out. There are clear di⁄erences in the responses
to a PCE as compared to the PC rule. A PCE rule will respond initially
more to the in￿ ation expectational error (real rates are initially higher with
the PCE than with the PC rule). This response causes a fall in in￿ ation
which in turn, given the history dependent pattern, will cause a reduction in
nominal rates (and real rates) in the following periods. In turn the PCE rule
will successfully stabilize in￿ ation and will reduce volatility of both output
and in￿ ation.





t ] by varying the relative weight on output, ￿; in the loss
function. For low levels of ￿, i.e. when the weight attached to the in￿ ation
objective is higher, an in￿ ation shock causes a sharper increase in the real
interest rate and therefore a more pronounced reduction in output. Also
in￿ ation and output are less persistent and revert quicker to their long-run
equilibrium. Similarly, when an expectational error hits the economy, there
will be a faster adjustment of in￿ ation towards equilibrium when the value
of lambda is lower.
5 Conclusions
A pragmatic monetary policy maker may wish to use each of the history
for, current and expected in￿ ation as information variables when following
a monetary rule. But such an approach cannot be explained alone by the
need to stabilize fundamental shocks (see Clarida et al, 2000). But we
show that it can, however, be explained well when there is the additional
possibility of non-fundamental shocks, or expectational errors. We suggest
that responding to both leads and lags of in￿ ation may therefore represent a
sensible stabilization strategy in the face of the possibility of expectational
errors.
As suggested by Orphanides and Williams (2005) and Evans and





t ] to di⁄erent policy rules.





t ] to di⁄erent values of the output weight ￿:
25Honkapohja (2003), if the process for in￿ ation is learnable, in￿ ation forecast
errors may be ruled out by a simple forecast-based rule. However, if we also
consider the possibility that expectational errors in in￿ ation are systemic
then we prove the intuition of Calmstrom and Fuerst (2000, 2004) that a
rule which responds to past in￿ ation will produce stability whereas one that
is solely forward-looking cannot. It has not escaped our attention that a
formal in￿ ation target may be interpreted to be such a form of commitment
to past in￿ ation deviations.22
In this paper we derive a general class of policy rules able to deal with the
determinacy of the model economy when expectational errors are systemic.
The policy implication of the optimal rule derived - the PCE rule - is that
the central bank should coordinate its stabilization e⁄ort by responding to
each of lagged, current and expected in￿ ation. That is commit to reponding
to previous errors and as well as current and expected errors in in￿ ation. We
also show that the PCE rule derived is analogous to the timeless policy rule
of Woodford (2003b) and to the expectational rule of Evans and Honkapohja
(2006). Hence an optimal policy rule will stabilize a forward-looking system
that is prone to expectational errors if it is inertial (in the sense that the
rule is constrained by past errors) and if this self-same rule is ￿ learnable￿i.e.
meets supplementary conditions for stability and uniqueness.
We illustrate our arguments with reference to the performance of US
in￿ ation since the late 1970s and suggest that it might be possible to
explain some of the reduction in the levels of both in￿ ation and its
persistence during the so-called ￿ Great Moderation￿period as resulting from
the implementation of some form of PCE rule for monetary policy. It would
appear from our work that if expectational errors cannot be ruled out then
co-ordinating stabilization policy across time will act to contain many of the
deleterious e⁄ects.
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29A Some Simple Rules for Establishing Stability in 2x2
Matrix for a Di⁄erence Equation
Let us de￿ne the polynomial function p(￿)
p(￿) = ￿2 ￿ ￿tr(A￿1B) + det(A￿1B) = 0; (A.1)
where ￿ will be a root of the equation when the polynomial equals zero. We
therefore draw this polynomial in tr(A￿1B) = tr(￿); det(A￿1B) = det(￿)
space for ￿ as a root:
det(￿) = ￿￿2 + ￿tr(￿): (A.2)
So for ￿ = 1, this line be positive and for ￿ = ￿1 the line will be negative.
The trace and determinant of a given 2x2 matrix will then determine how
many eigenvalues will lie inside or outside the unit circle.
A.1 Case 1 - saddle point: ￿1 < j1j and ￿2 > j1j.
No restrictions of either trace or determinant, per se.
For a positive trace:
det(￿) < ￿1 + tr(￿) (A.3)
det(￿) > ￿1 ￿ tr(￿): (A.4)
As in (Woodford, 2003a) we observe that tr(￿) = ￿1 + ￿2 and det(￿) =
￿1￿2. Conditions (A.3) and (A.4) imply respectively that (￿1￿1)(￿2￿1) < 0
and (￿1 +1)(￿2 +1) > 0: Hence the two roots are on the same side of 1 but
one is greater than 1 and the other is less than 1.
For a negative trace:
det(￿) > ￿1 + tr(￿) (A.5)
det(￿) < ￿1 ￿ tr(￿): (A.6)
This implies that (￿1 ￿ 1)(￿2 ￿ 1) > 0 and (￿1 + 1)(￿2 + 1) < 0: Hence
the two roots are on the same side of -1 but one is less than -1 and the other
is greater than -1.
30B Policy Rules and Expectational Errors
B.1 Current in￿ ation
Let us now consider the forward-looking in￿ ation equation ￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 +
kyt but add a demand equation, yt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1); and a policy rule
targeting current in￿ ation, it = ￿￿t. Setting k = 1 the in￿ ation equation
can be rewritten as:
￿t = (1 + ￿)Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t (B.1)
Let us keep the same non-fundamental shock driving expectations. In
















(1 + ￿)￿1(1 + ￿)
￿
!t:
The system is regular23 when both (A.3) and (A.4) hold. This is true if
￿ > ￿: However, there are no fundamental shocks in terms of which one
may solve for the expectational errors. So the system in not determinate.
B.1.1 Lagged In￿ ation
Let us now consider a policy rule targeting past in￿ ation. The reduced form




















If the equilibrium is unique there must be one unstable root that allows to
pin down the expectational error. Given that det(A￿1B) =￿(1+￿)￿1 > 0 it
must be that the two eigenvalues have the same sign. But as tr(A￿1B) =(1+
￿)￿1 < 1 this implies that they are both less than 1, whereas regularity
requires at least one of the two roots to lie outside the unit circle. So the
system is not either regular or determinate.
23In order to establish whether the system has a rational expectations equilibrium we
must establish whether our variables are predetermined or non-predetermined. We can
see that clearly ￿t is non-predetermined as it depends on how future expectations unfold.
Whereas ￿
e
t = Et￿1￿t is a predetermined as Et￿1￿
e
t = Et￿1Et￿1￿t = ￿
e
t (see also Sims,
2001).
31B.1.2 Expected in￿ ation and current in￿ ation
The policy rule is targeting both current and expected in￿ ation in equal






















The system is regular when both (A.3) and (A.4) hold. This is true if
￿ > ￿=2: However there are no fundamental shocks in terms of which one
may solve for the expectational errors. So the system is not determinate.
B.1.3 Backward in￿ ation and current in￿ ation
The policy rule is targeting both current and backward in￿ ation in equal
























This does not help either. The model reduces to a linear stochastic
rational expectation model, with a predetermined variable. Regularity in
this setting would require at least one of the two roots to lie outside the unit
circle. Given the positive trace we can easily verify that the condition (A.3)
det(￿) < ￿1 + tr(￿) is not satis￿ed. So the system is not either regular or
determinate.
C Solution for In￿ ation
In the simple case ￿ = ￿ = 1; by replacing the interest rate rule (25) and
the demand equation (19) in (18) we derive the reduced form equation for
















































































The eigenvalues of A￿1B are related to the parameters by the equations:









￿￿s￿u ￿s + ￿u
￿
: (C.4)
We have shown in the text that one of the roots lies outside the unit
circle and another inside. Therefore we assume that ￿u > 1 and ￿s < 1:
The two eigenvectors of A￿1B are equal to:
￿
0 1










=) v1 = ￿s (C.5)
￿
0 1










=) v2 = ￿u:
The matrix A￿1B can be decomposed as Q￿Q￿1 where Q is the matrix










































































Zt+1 = ￿Zt + &t;













































￿u ￿ ￿s￿t ￿
1



























The stable block is iterated backwards to derive the stability conditions










so it can be iterated backwards only if the eigenvalues in ￿s lie inside the
unit circle.













34If the roots lie outside the unit circle then limn!1
￿ 1
￿u
￿n = 0 which
implies Zu





￿u ￿ ￿sEt￿t+1 = 0 (C.12)
hence Et￿t+1 = ￿s￿t: Using this result and the de￿nition of Zs
t from (C.9)
it follows that Zs
t = ￿t:
Given the de￿nition of Zu
t+1 in (B.8) if Zu
t = 0 it must also be &u
t = 0












t = ￿t, considering the de￿nition of &s
t from (C.9) and the
relationship between !t and v￿






￿t = ￿s￿t￿1 +
￿
(1 + ￿)

















ABOUT THE CDMA 
 
  The Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis was established by a direct 
grant from the University of St Andrews in 2003. The Centre funds PhD students and 
facilitates a programme of research centred on macroeconomic theory and policy. The 
Centre has research interests in areas such as: characterising the key stylised facts of 
the business cycle; constructing theoretical models that can match these business 
cycles; using theoretical models to understand the normative and positive aspects of 
the macroeconomic policymakers' stabilisation problem, in both open and closed 
economies; understanding the conduct of monetary/macroeconomic policy in the UK 
and other countries; analyzing the impact of globalization and policy reform on the 
macroeconomy; and analyzing the impact of financial factors on the long-run growth 
of the UK economy, from both an historical and a theoretical perspective. The Centre 
also has interests in developing numerical techniques for analyzing dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models. Its affiliated members are Faculty members at St Andrews 
and elsewhere with interests in the broad area of dynamic macroeconomics. Its 
international Advisory Board comprises a group of leading macroeconomists and, ex 
officio, the University's Principal. 
 
 
Affiliated Members of the School 
Dr Arnab Bhattacharjee. 
Dr Tatiana Damjanovic. 
Dr Vladislav Damjanovic.  
Dr Laurence Lasselle.  
Dr Peter Macmillan. 
Prof Kaushik Mitra. 
Prof Charles Nolan (Director). 
Dr Geetha Selvaretnam. 
Dr Gary Shea.  
Prof Alan Sutherland. 
Dr Kannika Thampanishvong. 
Dr Christoph Thoenissen.  
 
Senior Research Fellow 
Prof Andrew Hughes Hallett, Professor of 
Economics, Vanderbilt University.  
 
Research Affiliates 
Prof Keith Blackburn, Manchester University.  
Prof David Cobham, Heriot-Watt University. 
Dr Luisa Corrado, Università degli Studi di Roma.  
Prof Huw Dixon, York University. 
Dr Anthony Garratt, Birkbeck College London. 
Dr Sugata Ghosh, Brunel University.  
Dr Aditya Goenka, Essex University.  
Dr Campbell Leith, Glasgow University.  
Dr Richard Mash, New College, Oxford.  
Prof Patrick Minford, Cardiff Business School.  
Dr Gulcin Ozkan, York University.  
Prof Joe Pearlman, London Metropolitan 
University.  
Prof Neil Rankin, Warwick University.  
Prof Lucio Sarno, Warwick University.  
Prof Eric Schaling, Rand Afrikaans University.  
Prof Peter N. Smith, York University. 
Dr Frank Smets, European Central Bank.  
Dr Robert Sollis, Durham University.  
Dr Peter Tinsley, George Washington University 
and Federal Reserve Board.  
Dr Mark Weder, University of Adelaide.  
 
Research Associates 
Mr Nikola Bokan.  
Mr. Farid Boumediene. 
Mr. Johannes Geissler. 
Mr Michal Horvath.  
Ms Elisa Newby.  
Mr Ansgar Rannenberg. 
Mr Qi Sun.  
Mr Alex Trew.  
 
Advisory Board 
Prof Sumru Altug, Koç University.  
Prof V V Chari, Minnesota University.  
Prof John Driffill, Birkbeck College London.  
Dr Sean Holly, Director of the Department of 
Applied Economics, Cambridge University.  
Prof Seppo Honkapohja, Cambridge University.  
Dr Brian Lang, Principal of St Andrews University.  
Prof Anton Muscatelli, Glasgow University.  
Prof Charles Nolan, St Andrews University.  
Prof Peter Sinclair, Birmingham University and 
Bank of England.  
Prof Stephen J Turnovsky, Washington University.  
Dr Martin Weale, CBE, Director of the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research.  
Prof Michael Wickens, York University.  
Prof Simon Wren-Lewis, Exeter University.  www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma 
RECENT WORKING PAPERS FROM THE  
CENTRE FOR DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
Number Title  Author(s) 
CDMA05/11  Money and Monetary Policy in 
Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Models 
Arnab Bhattacharjee (St Andrews) 
and Christoph Thoenissen (St 
Andrews) 
CDMA05/12 Understanding  Financial  Derivatives 
During the South Sea Bubble: The 
case of the South Sea Subscription 
shares 
Gary S. Shea (St Andrews) 
CDMA06/01  Sticky Prices and Indeterminacy  Mark Weder (Adelaide) 
CDMA06/02  Independence Day for the “Old 
Lady”: A Natural Experiment on the 
Implications of Central Bank 
Independence 
Jagjit S. Chadha (BNP Paribas and 
Brunel), Peter Macmillan (St 
Andrews) and Charles Nolan (St 
Andrews) 
CDMA06/03  On the Determinacy of Monetary 
Policy under Expectational Errors 
Jagjit S. Chadha (BNP Paribas and 
Brunel) and Luisa Corrado 
(Cambridge and Rome Tor 
Vergata) 
CDMA06/04  Labour and Product Market Reforms 
in an Economy with Distortionary 
Taxation 
 
Nikola Bokan (St Andrews and 
CEBR), Andrew Hughes Hallett 
(Vanderbilt and CEPR) 
CDMA06/05  Sir George Caswall vs. the Duke of 
Portland: Financial Contracts and 
Litigation in the wake of the South 
Sea Bubble 
Gary S. Shea (St Andrews) 
CDMA06/06  Optimal Time Consistent Monetary 
Policy 
Tatiana Damjanovic (St Andrews), 
Vladislav Damjanovic (St 
Andrews) and Charles Nolan (St 
Andrews) 
CDMA06/07  Monetary-Fiscal Interactions When  
Public Debt is Stationary 
Michal Horvath (St Andrews) 
CDMA06/08  Bank Lending with Imperfect 
Competition and Spillover Effects 
Sumru G. Altug (Koç and CEPR) 
and Murat Usman (Koç) 
CDMA06/09  Real Exchange Rate Volatility and 
Asset Market Structure 
Christoph Thoenissen (St 
Andrews) www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma 
CDMA06/10  Disinflation in an Open-Economy 
Staggered-Wage DGE Model: 
Exchange-Rate Pegging, Booms and 
the Role of Preannouncement 
John Fender (Birmingham) and 
Neil Rankin (Warwick) 
CDMA06/11  Relative Price Distortions and 
Inflation Persistence 
Tatiana Damjanovic (St Andrews) 
and Charles Nolan (St Andrews) 
CDMA06/12  Taking Personalities out of Monetary 
Policy Decision Making? 
Interactions, Heterogeneity and 
Committee Decisions in the Bank of 
England’s MPC 
Arnab Bhattacharjee (St Andrews) 
and Sean Holly (Cambridge) 
CDMA07/01  Is There More than One Way to be 
E-Stable? 
Joseph Pearlman (London 
Metropolitan) 
CDMA07/02  Endogenous Financial Development 
and Industrial Takeoff 
Alex Trew (St Andrews) 
CDMA07/03  Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
in an Economy with Non-Ricardian 
Agents 
Michal Horvath (St Andrews) 
CDMA07/04  Investment Frictions and the Relative 
Price of Investment Goods in an 
Open Economy Model 
Parantap Basu (Durham) and 
Christoph Thoenissen (St 
Andrews) 
CDMA07/05  Growth and Welfare Effects of 
Stablizing Innovation Cycles 
Marta Aloi (Nottingham) and 
Laurence Lasselle (St Andrews) 
CDMA07/06  Stability and Cycles in a Cobweb 
Model with Heterogeneous 
Expectations 
Laurence Lasselle (St Andrews), 
Serge Svizzero (La Réunion) and 
Clem Tisdell (Queensland) 
CDMA07/07  The Suspension of Monetary 
Payments as a Monetary Regime 
Elisa Newby (St Andrews) 
CDMA07/08  Macroeconomic Implications of 
Gold Reserve Policy of the Bank of 
England during the Eighteenth 
Century 
Elisa Newby (St Andrews) 
CDMA07/09  S,s Pricing in General Equilibrium 
Models with Heterogeneous Sectors 
Vladislav Damjanovic (St 
Andrews) and Charles Nolan (St 
Andrews) 
 
For information or copies of working papers in this series, or to subscribe to email notification, contact: 
 
Alex Trew 
Castlecliffe, School of Economics and Finance 
University of St Andrews 
Fife, UK, KY16 9AL 
 
Email: awt2@st-and.ac.uk; Phone: +44 (0)1334 462445; Fax: +44 (0)1334 462444. 